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DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF
THE CONSTITUTION.
A constitution is a living instrument. Framed at the beginning
of a nation its purpose is to provide a national rule of action for all
time and through every stage of the nation's development. The
makers of a constitution may have in their minds particular applica-
tions of the language used, but no such limitations attach to the
words themselves. The language may, in the course of events,
become applicable to conditions beyond the imagination of those
who adopted it. The framers of a constitution, of all men, may
build better than they know.
The words of a written constitution are changeless, but their
meaning is not always the same. In the light of experience words
possess new meanings in men's minds. History interprets constitu-
tional provisions. The crisis of a nation make things clear which
were in doubt before. The rule that in the interpretation of written
instruments the object is to ascertain the intention of the makers is
not, therefore, wholly controlling in the construction of constitu-
tional provisions. The purpose of the framers of a constitution
may properly be considered as an element in its interpretation, but
the practical application of its provisions must always be deter-
mined in view of changed economic conditions and of the funda-
mental principle that a constitution, whenever framed, is always a
present rule of national life.
The principle of constitutional evolution through interpretation
is most strikingly illustrated in the case of the commerce clause of
the Constitution of the United States. The federal commercial
power-the essentially nationalizing power-has been brought out
through the interpretation of the commerce clause, in the light of
history and the nation's growth, by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The series of decisions marking that development mark,
also, American commercial progress and furnish the most enduring
monuments of the greatness of the tribunal which rendered them.
An examination of the history of the times prior to the adoption
of the Constitution shows that the regulation of foreign commerce
was demanded by the exigencies of the Union. The Articles of
Confederation reserved to the states the right to levy duties, except
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such as might interfere with stipulations in the treaties with France
and Spain. The commerce of the country was under the control of
the state legislatures. It was the commerce of thirteen states and
not of a single nation. Diverse regulations caused confusion and
clashing. The preservation of American shipping required the
adoption of a navigation act. The existence of the United States
as a commercial power made necessary a central authority to control
intercourse with all the states. The financial difficulties of the Con-
federation showed plainly the necessity for a national means of
raising national revenue. The Confederation was a government
with power to incur obligations, but without power to discharge
them. National debts were parcelled out among the states and thir-
teen independent legislatures granted or withheld the means of pay-
ment. The credit of the nation demanded that a national revenue
should be provided, and a tariff on imported goods furnished a
readily available method of raising it.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution commerce among
the states existed only in a small way. The states lay along the sea-
board and the principal means of communication was by sailing ves-
sels. Stage coaches, wagons and pack-horses furnished the means
of inland transportation. There were few manufactories, and those
which existed usually supplied only the markets in their immediate
vicinity. The necessaries were produced at home. The luxuries
were brought from abroad. The slight interstate trade that existed,
moreover, was impeded by the imposition of duties by the different
states upon the traffic across their borders. The levying of imposts
by the states upon goods brought in from other states was an easy
means of raising revenue-a means appealing alike to selfishness
and local prejudice. That such imposition could only result in
rivalry between the states and the elimination of all common inter-
ests was generally acknowledged and the necessity for their aboli-
tion was generally felt. But there is no indication in the history of
the times nor in the debates in the Constitutional Convention that
any other or further regulation of interstate commerce was contem-
plated.
The Convention met and framed a Constitution containing this
provision: "The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and
with the Indian tribes." By the adoption of this clause in its grant
of legislative powers the Constitutional Convention created the fed-
eral commercial power and provided for unity of commercial regu-
lation.
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The adoption of the commerce clause marked an epoch-the
beginning of the development of commercial supremacy from com-
mercial chaos. And yet no member of the Convention appreciated
the possibilities of the language used. There is nothing to indicate
that anything further was intended than the uniform regulation of
foreign commerce and the prevention of imposts at state lines. Cer-
tainly the people had in mind foreign commerce when they bore the
ship "Federal Constitution" with colors flying, as the central figure
of the pageants in honor of the ratification of the Constitution.
But while the purpose of the framers of the Constitution in
respect ofinterstate commerce was limited in its scope the language
used was broad and comprehensive and has become applicable to
conditions incomparably changed. The growth of the nation in
territory and population has only kept pace with mechanical and
scientific development in furnishing means of transportation. For-
eign commerce is now insignificant when compared with interstate
commerce. The amount of merchandise transported across state
lines is stupendous. The power conferred upon Congress to regu-
late this commerce among the states-to control transportation and
intercourse-is among the great powers of the federal govern-
ment. As a nationalizing power-a power which works towards
one nation instead of a collection of states-it is the most important
power of all. Power in the general government to regulate foreign
commerce is essential to the standing of the United States as one of
the commercial powers of the world. Power to regulate interstate
commerce is essential to the upbuilding of a great nation.
And the development of the federal commercial power has
resulted from the definitions of two words. The Constitution
grants to Congress power to "regulate commerce." As already
shown, a narrow meaning given to those words would have been in
accordance with the intention of the framers of the Constitution, as
that intention may be gathered from the history of the times.
Neither the word "commerce" nor the word "regulate" is a word
of precise meaning, and it was necessarily left to the Supreme Court,
by defining the words, to broaden or limit the power. The widening
scope of the commerce clause has followed from the broadening defi-
nitions of the words, "commerce" and "regulate."
The word "commerce" might have been defined, in the language
of the dictionary, as "an exchange of merchandise between different
places," and as an equivalent for "trade ;" and the purpose of the
Constitutional Convention, in providing for national duties on
imports and preventing imposts at state lines, would have been fully
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met. Moreover, the regulation of trade with foreign countries has
never required that the word "commerce" should receive a broad
definition. On the other hand, the existence of an effective federal
power in respect of interstate commerce does require that that term
should be held to include, broadly, all commercial intercourse
between the states.
The Supreme Court has met the exigencies of the case. It has
said that the word "commerce," as used in the commerce clause, "is
a term of the largest import" and has given this definition: "Com-
merce among the states consists of intercourse and traffic between
their citizens, and includes the transportation of persons and prop-
erty, and the navigation of public waters for that purpose, as well
as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities." (Gloucester
Ferry Company v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 203.)
An analysis of this definition shows that interstate commerce
includes:
(i) The transportation of property from one state to another.
(2) The transportation of persons from one state to another.
(3) The navigation of public waters for transportation pur-
poses.
(4) The purchase, sale and exchange of commodities between
citizens of different states.
This broad definition of interstate commerce has been the result
of gradual growth. In the earliest interstate commerce case, the
great case of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. i, it was held that the
word commerce comprehended navigation, and that a power to reg-
ulate navigation was as expressly conferred as if that term had been
added. Extending this doctrine, it is held that navigation involves
the control of navigable waters, and necessarily includes the power
to keep them open and free from obstruction, and to make improve-
ments in them. This conclusion that the federal government, under
the commerce clause, has power to authorize improvements in waters
within the limits of a state, is a striking illustration of the principle
that history and the nation's necessities may outweigh the intention
of the framers of the Constitution.
The word "commerce," upon its face apparently refers to the
traffic in commodities; but it is held also to include the transporta-
tion of passengers from state to state, their embarkation and dis-
embarkation. Transportation is, however, an essential element of
commerce. Without transportation there can be no commerce.
Production, therefore, is not commerce. "Manufacture succeeds to
commerce and is not a part of it." While the operation of a manu-
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facturing establishment necessarily involves the shipment of its
product, the process of manufacture is distinct from the process
of transportation. The former process is the subject of state regu-
lation; the latter, of federal control. Similarly, banking and
insurance do not constitute commerce, because they do not involve
the element of transportation.
The broadening power over interstate commerce given to Con-
gress by the decisions is, however, even more clearly shown in the
widening definition of the word "regulate" than in the case of the
word "commerce." If, as said by President Monroe in a message
to Congress, nothing more was intended than to prevent the impo-
sition of duties by states upon goods brought in from other states,
the word "regulate" was very limited in its scope. And the circum-
stances surrounding the adoption of the commerce clause also sup-
port the view that the power was intended to be limited and, to a cer-
tain extent, concurrent with the powers of the several states. The
motion to give Congress the "sole and exclusive" power over co-i
merce was lost in the Constitutional Convention. That the power
of Congress was merely concurrent with that of the states and
involved no prohibition of state action not inconsistent with federal
laws was, moreover, the opinion of the attorney-general immediately
after the adoption of the Constitution (Opinion of Edmund Ran-
dolph, attorney-general, Feb. 12, I79I), and of different state
courts.
It was acknowledged from the beginning that the power of
Congress, when exercised, was paramount. The essential question
was whether it was exclusive or concurrent. This question was
first answered in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, in which Chief Justice
Marshall said that the federal commercial power was indivisible
and therefore exclusive of a like power in a co-ordinate sovereignty.
The underlying principle is, that the power to regulate being the
power to restrain, the grant of power to regulate necessarily implies
power to determine what shall remain unrestrained. Inaction by
Congress is equivalent to an affirmative declaration that no action
is desired. Accordingly, while the decision in Gibbons v. Ogden
has not always been followed, it is now well settled by the Supreme
Court of the United States that, with respect to all subjects national
in character and admitting uniformity of regulation, the federal
commercial power is not only paramount, but exclusive.
Interstate commerce, consisting of the sale, exchange and trans-
portation of commodities and the transportation of persons mani-
festly admits of uniform regulation, and is subject solely to the con-
trol of Congress. The states are without power to impose any bur-
dens upon such commerce, or to interfere with it in any way. It is
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only in the case of local matters-in matters which are rather auxil-
iary to commerce than a part of it-that the states have power 
to act
in the absence of action by Congress.
The Supreme Court has many times said that the power 
to
regulate commerce is to prescribe the rule by which it is to be gov-
erned. But this observation must always be read in the light of the
likewise often repeated statement of the court that the power of
Congress under the commerce clause is plenary, complete in itself
and subject to no limitations other than those to be found in the
Constitution. A wide discretion is left to Congress in exercising
the power conferred. It may go further than to determine the man-
ner in which the various kinds of commerce shall be carried on. As
held by the Supreme Court in the Lottry Case, i88 U. S. 321, legis-
lation under the commerce clause may sometimes assume the form
and have the effect of prohibition. How far this doctrine will be
carried-whether, for example, a statute prohibiting monopolistic
corporations from engaging in interstate commerce would be held
to be a legitimate exercise of the power of Congress-remains to be
seen.
While Congress was granted by the Constitution plenary power
over interstate commerce it practically failed to exercise it for a hun-
dred years. The development of the federal power which we have
noted was rather in a negative than in a positive way. The Supreme
Court was called upon to say what the states could not do instead of
what Congress could do-except as the one necessarily followed
from the other. It was in determining the constitutionality of state
legislation that the great principles which we have outlined were
laid down. In 1887, however, Congress passed the Interstate Com-
merce Act, and, in 189o, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Both of
these measures are of great and increasing importance. In the one,
as amended, a comprehensive system for the control of carriers
engaged in interstate commerce is stated, and in the other all com-
binations in restraint of such commerce are prohibited.
We have thus traced the outline of the development of the fed-
eral commercial power. And the end is not yet. The tendency in
this country toward a centralization of power is increasing. The
field of the national government is constantly widening. The nation
is dealing more and more with problems formerly thought to belong
exclusively to the states. A unity is growing out of a union. And
the primary source of all this nationalizing power is the commerce
clause of the Constitution. Walter C. Noyes,
Judge of the Court of Common Pleas,
New London- County, Conn.
